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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 14201

vs.
DENNIS D. KAZDA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with theft, a felony
of the third degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury on the 12th and
13th days of June, 19 75, before the Honorable Gordon
R. Hall, Judge.

Appellant was found guilty of theft

and sentenced to serve an indeterminant terra of up to
five years in the Utah State Prison.

This sentence is

to run concurrently with one of the same length which
appellant is presently serving.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the conviction
affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 1, 1974, three men came onto the
Hogan Ranch, in Tooele County (T. 30,31).

The men

began to cut copper telephone wire from the telephone poles
(T. 33). Mr. Hogan felt suspicious and called the sheriff
(T. 32). The sheriff contacted the telephone company
and learned that no one was authorized to be taking
down any wire at the Hogan Ranch (T. 59).

Telephone

employees and the sheriff arrived at the scene and the
three men were arrested (T. 183, 134). The men were
identified as Dennis Kazda, appellant in this case, Max
Stockton and Max Reay (T. 170). All of the above is
undisputed.
Another fact, however, was strongly disputed.
Appellant testified that he had a contract to remove
the wire (T. 176). Appellant claimed that he met a
Mr. Johnson who represented himself as an employee of
the telephone company (T. 173,174).

Appellant further ,

claims that this Mr. Johnson agreed to pay him for
removing wire from telephone poles (T. 175) .
It is very interesting that appellant related
that he and this Mr. Johnson went to the ranch on
September 26th so Mr. Johnson could show him which
lines to take down (T. 172). On that day a ranch

employee, Mr. Degelbeck, saw appellant and another man
drive up to the ranch and stop (T. 17). Degelbeck was
only twenty-five yards from the men who got out of
their truck (T. 212). From that short distance Degelbeck could see appellant and the man who appellant
swears was Mr. Johnson (T. 172). However, significantly,
Mr. Degelbeck identified the second individual not as
Mr. Johnson, but as Max Reay, a codefendant of appellants
(T. 213).
Mr. Degelbeck"s identification of Reay is
corroborated by the fact that Mr. Degelbeck said that
the man had a limp (T. 18). One month later at the
preliminary hearing Mr. Degelbeck again saw Mr. Reay
and testified that he limped at that time also (T. 216).
Furthermore, the sheriff who arrested Reay testified
that Reay complained about his foot and had a light
cast on it (T. 115).

It seems that the only significant

question of fact for the jury was whether or not Mr.
Johnson and the contract ever existed.
POINT I
ON APPEAL, APPELLANT MAY NOT CHARGE AS ERROR
THE TRIAL COURTfS FAILURE TO GIVE A CERTAIN INSTRUCTION
WHEN APPELLANT NEITHER REQUESTED THE INSTRUCTION NOR
CALLED THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO ITS OMISSION.

,

I
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Appellant alleges that the trial court
committed error in that it failed to give an instruction concerning the defense of "Mistake - of-fact."
Appellant cites State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d
952 (1936), and other cases in support of the proposition that when a court fails to instruct on a certain
point, and no timely exception is taken, in certain
circumstances the Supreme Court may consider the
alleged error on appeal.

Respondent contends that

appellant misconstrues the holding of Cobo and the
law in Utah.

It is true that the Supreme Court may,

under special circumstances, consider the fact that
a trial court gave erroneous instructions even though
no timely exception was taken, and that notice may be
taken when requested instructions are denied.

Respon-

dent, however, submits that when a certain instruction
was neither requested nor called to the attention of the
court, the rule in Utah is that the unchallenged failure to give it will not be noticed on appeal.
In State v. Cobo, supra, the trial court gave
a certain instruction to the jury which was incorrect
and prejudicial.

The defendant, however, failed to

object to the instruction.

On appeal, the Supreme Court

of Utah noted the error anyway and reversed the conviction.

Therefore, Cobo is no authority for appellant in the
instant

case*

There is a great difference between

giving an erroneous instruction as in Cobo, and not
giving an unrequested instruction as in the instant
case.

This distinction was pointed out and clarified

in the later case, State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240
P.2d 504, 507 (1952), wherein the Utah Supreme Court

"We have held that where
instructions are palpably erroneous . . .
we may notice the error without
exception having been taken. State
v,Cobo . . . .
But, we are aware
of no holding that the mere failure
to give an instruction which might
have been given but which was not
requested or called to the attention
2JL the court, and no exception taken
to the failure to give it, will be
noticed on appeal." (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court made the same statement in State
v. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P.2d 354, 360 (1940), but
also added:
"Having approved the instructions
as given and requested no others, counsel
should not be heard to complain that the
Court did not constitute itself counsel
in the cause, and submit other theories
not urged by the defendant . . . .
It
is the court's duty to try the issues . . .
and not to make the case for them."

Other jurisdictions are in accord with the
Utah position.

The Washington Supreme Court said:

"Misdirection may be error, but
nondirection, in the absence of a
request, is never error." State v.
Myers, 53 Wash.2d 446, 334 P.2d
536, 539 (1959).
The Supreme Court of Idaho said:
"If the appellant desired
further instructions on a particular point it was his duty to
request them. . .and in the absence
of such request error cannot be
assigned." State v. Kelly, 95
Idaho 851, 521 P.2d 1150 (1974).
See also holdings from Arizona, State v. Taylor, 109
Ariz. 481, 512 P.2d 590 (1973), and Montana, State v.
Peters, 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642 (1965).
Respondent respectfully submits that appellantfs
Point One, the question of whether the jury should have
been instructed on the defense of "mistake - in - fact,"
is not properly before this court and should be dismissed since appellant neither requested the instruction,
called it to the attention of the court, nor made timely
exception to the omission.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE COBO RULE WERE TO PROVIDE THAT
UNREQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS COULD BE NOTICED ON APPEAL,
THE PRESENT CASE WOULD NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
COBO.

As demonstrated in point one of this brief,
the Cobo rule, an exception to the general rule that
alleged errors will not be considered on appeal unless
timely exceptions were made, does not comprehend
the situation of the instant case, an instruction
was neither given, nor requested or called to the
attention of the court.

However, even if the Cobo

exception did provide that unrequested instructions could
be noted on appeal, there are further requirements of
the Cobo rule which are not met by the facts of the
instant case.
The Cobo exception reads, in part, as follows:
". . . w e think that when palpable
error is made to appear on the face of
the record . . . to the manifest prejudice
of the accused . . . ." 60 P.2d at 958.
Obviously, before the Cobo exception can be used there
must first be error, and, second, the error must be
prejudicial to the accused.

Case law over the years

has indicated that even though error is found, if it
is not prejudicial, the Cobo exception will not be
used.

State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113

(1972), State v. Murphy, 27 Utah 2d 98, 493 P.2d 617
(1972), and State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d
246 (19 70).

Respondent submits that there was no

error committed by the trial court and if there was,
that error was not prejudicial to appellant.
The error claim by appellant is that the
trial court failed to instruct the jury concerning a
defense to theft known as "mistake - in - fact."
It is admitted that the trial court did not use those
exact words, however, the effect of the instructions
given was the same as if those words had been used.
In instruction number twelve the court said:
"That is, a person acts
knowingly with respect to a
result of his conduct when
he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to deprive
the owner of property.""
(Emphasis added.)
It must be assumed that the jury understood this
instruction.

Therefore, the jury realized that they .

could not convict appellant if they found that he
v/as unaware that what he was doing would deprive the
owner, Mountain Bell, of its property.

In other words,

the jury was informed that they were to acquit if they
found that appellant mistakenly thought that he had a
valid contract with Mountain Bell.

An added instruc-

tion using the words "mistake - o f - fact" would have
added nothing to the words "he is aware."

It is no

error to use different words which mean the same thing.

i <

Finally, even if there was error in not giving
the requested instruction, the error was not prejudicial
to appellant.

This is easily demonstrated by the fact

that of the two codefendants tried together in the
trial court below, only one, the appellant in this
case, was convicted.
As indicated in the facts, appellant claimed
that he made a contract with a Mr. Johnson to remove
copper telephone wire (T. 174, 175). Appellant then
testified that he later hired Mr. Stockton to help him
remove the wire (T. 192). On cross-examination by
Mr. Stockton's counsel appellant testified to the circumstances of his hiring Mr. Stockton.

Appellant

admitted that Stockton was not present when the alleged
contract was made but only removed wire because of his
(appellant's) representation that there was a contract
(T. 192). So appellant's entire defense centered on his
own claim that Mr. Johnson and the contract did exist.
Mr. Stockton's entire defense also centered on appellant's claim that Mr. Johnson and the contract did
exist.

The jury found appellant guilty and Stockton

innocent.
difference?

Since both removed wire, what was the
The only logical explanation is that

I

the jury found that there was no Mr. Johnson and
no contract and that appellant was not unaware of
this, or mistaken - in - fact.

At the same time the

jury found that Mr. Stockton had an honest albeit
mistaken belief, based on appellant's representation,
that there was a contract.

Thus, even though not

instructed in exactly those words, the jury considered the "mistake - in - fact" defense.

Therefore,

even if the court erred by not instructing on 'Mistake in - fact/' it is clear that the jury considered that
defense and the error was not prejudicial.
In summary, respondent contends that this
court should not consider appellant's contention that
the trial court erred in not instructing on the defense
of "mistake - of - fact" since such an instruction was
neither requested nor was its absence objected to.
Respondent further contends that even if this court
does consider appellant1s contention, it will find
no error since the "mistake - of - fact" defense
was included in the jury instruction by the trial
court, using different words.

Respondent finally

contends that even if the trial court did err in not
using the words "mistake - of - fact" such error was
not prejudicial since the jury considered that defense
anyway in their deliberation.

Appellant has not

I

carried his burden of proof on appeal and has not
demonstrated prejudicial error; therefore, the conviction should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR BY INSTRUCTING
THE JURY AS TO THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "RECKLESS
INTENT."
Utah Code Ann. 5 76-2-101 (Supp. 1975),
states the Utah law on principles of criminal responsibility.

That section reads:

"No person is guilty of an
offense unless. . . (1) he acts
intentionally, knowingly, recklessl_y, or with criminal negligence. . . . "
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101 (1975).
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, appellant could have been convicted
if he acted recklessly in removing the copper telephone
wires.

The trial court instructed on applicable Utah

law just as it is in the Code.

Instruction number

twelve, which appellant claims was erroneous, simply
defines the terms "Intentionally," "Knowingly," and
"Reckless Intent."

The court's instructions are

almost duplicate of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (Supp.
1975), which provides:

~ i i -

" (1) Intentionally, . . . with
respect to the nature of his conduct
or to a result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(2) Knowingly. . .with respect
to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware
of the nature of his conduct or the
existing circumstances. A person
acts knowingly. . .with respect to
a result of his conduct when he is
aware that his conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly . . . with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and justifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. . ."
Instruction twelve provided:
1. "Intentionally" means that with
respect to the nature of the defendant's
conduct or a result of his conduct,
it was the defendant's conscious
objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
2. "Knowingly" means that with
respect to the defendant's conduct or
circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances.
That is a person acts knowingly with
respect to a result of his conduct when
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to deprive the owner of
property.

1 O

I

3. "Reckless Intent" with respect
to circumstances surrounding one's conduct
means conduct which a person is aware of
but consciously disregards that a
substantial risk that a person's property will be taken unlawfully."

Since the instructions were identical in meaning
with the Utah Code and since Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101,
supra, specifically states that intent can be "reckless,"
there was no error in submitting an instruction to the
jury on Reckless Intent.

Appellant's conviction

should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court may not notice as an
alleged error on appeal an instruction which was not
given, when appellant neither requested the instruction nor objected to its absence.

Even if this court

could notice that type of error, there was no error
in this case.

Also, even if there was error it was

not prejudicial.

Furthermore, the trial court

committed no error in instructing on reckless intent
since the Utah Code requires and defines that term
exactly as given by the trial court.

Respondent

respectfully requests this court to affirm appellant's
conviction.
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General

